Nigeria’s Government Arms Terror-Linked Militias

The arrest of a group of armed Fulani militants in Kwara State on December 12, 2025, revealed a chilling reality that has sent shockwaves through the nation’s security establishment and raised urgent questions about state complicity in escalating violence. During an interrogation captured on video, one of the suspects calmly disclosed that the AK-47 rifles and patrol vehicle they possessed were supplied directly by officials within the Kwara State Government, adding that they had been operating under the pretense of official patrol duties for some time. The Kwara State Government later issued a statement that, instead of refuting the claim, confirmed the men were members of the Fulani socio-cultural organization Miyetti Allah and were participating in a federally coordinated security operation under the purview of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). This official acknowledgment crossed a dangerous line, confirming that an armed ethnic militia, repeatedly implicated in terrorist acts, was formally integrated into state-backed security operations. This development is not merely a sign of incompetence but points toward a profound institutional collapse from within Nigeria’s security architecture.

1. Vigilantes or State-Sanctioned Proxies

The deployment of these armed operatives raises fundamental questions, particularly given the local context of Kwara State, which is predominantly Yoruba territory, not Fulani. Over the past several months, Yoruba farming communities in the region have experienced a surge in violent attacks attributed to Fulani terrorists, forcing many to flee their ancestral lands. Against this backdrop of fear and displacement, the decision to deploy Fulani “vigilantes” to provide security for the very communities being targeted by Fulani militants is deeply unsettling and counterintuitive. It begs the question of why local Yoruba vigilante groups were not empowered to protect their own people. The exclusion of local populations from their own security arrangements, while simultaneously arming and legitimizing an ethnic group with a documented history of violent expansionism, suggests a strategy that goes far beyond simple community policing. Observers have characterized this approach as a form of demographic and security engineering, designed to alter the regional power balance under the guise of maintaining order. This policy effectively erodes trust between citizens and the state, creating a volatile environment where the government is perceived not as a protector but as an enabler of aggression.

This strategy of arming external militias while sidelining local defense efforts has severe implications for national stability. By officially sanctioning a group like Miyetti Allah, which has been accused of mass atrocities, the state grants legitimacy to a non-state actor with a partisan agenda. This undermines the authority and neutrality of formal security institutions like the police and the military, whose constitutional mandate is to protect all citizens impartially. Furthermore, it sets a dangerous precedent, potentially encouraging other ethnic or regional groups to form their own armed militias to defend their interests, thereby accelerating the country’s descent into factional conflict. The professional framework of a national security architecture is built on the principle of a state monopoly on violence, a principle that is catastrophically breached when government officials outsource public safety to groups tied to insurgent activities. The long-term consequences include the deepening of ethnic divisions, the proliferation of arms, and the creation of ungoverned spaces where state-sanctioned militias operate with impunity, accountable to their patrons rather than to the Nigerian people or the rule of law.

2. A Disturbing and Well-Documented Pattern

The incident in Kwara State is not an isolated anomaly but rather the latest manifestation of a disturbing and well-documented pattern of state-level engagement with armed groups. In January 2024, Miyetti Allah leader Bello Bodejo publicly announced the formation of a 1,144-strong armed militia, which he euphemistically described as a “vigilante group.” The launch ceremony for this force was held in Lafia, the capital of Nasarawa State, with Governor Abdullahi Sule listed as a special guest of honor. This event was particularly alarming because Nasarawa State has long been identified by survivors, journalists, and international observers as a sanctuary for Fulani terrorist camps. These camps are reportedly used as staging grounds for devastating attacks on communities in the neighboring states of Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and Southern Kaduna. The official sanctioning of such a militia in a state already implicated as a hub for regional violence represented a significant escalation. When Bodejo was later arrested and charged with terrorism, his confessional statement included the explosive allegation that Governor Sule had personally pressured him to establish the militia, known as Kungiya Zaman Lafiya, further blurring the lines between state governance and non-state armed actors.

The resolution of Bello Bodejo’s case only deepened concerns about high-level complicity. Despite the gravity of the terrorism charges against him, Bodejo was released without trial, a move that critics allege was orchestrated by Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. Following his release, the 1,144 armed “vigilantes” he had assembled effectively vanished without any official process of disarmament, accountability, or public explanation. This lack of follow-through left a large, unaccountable armed group at large. The subsequent revelations from the Kwara State arrests now place the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) at the heart of another scandal involving armed Fulani operatives being formally embedded within state-sanctioned security frameworks. This recurring theme suggests a deliberate policy rather than a series of administrative errors. For a nation grappling with a multifaceted security crisis, the repeated appearance of the ONSA in contexts that empower and legitimize militias linked to violence represents a severe compromise of national security interests and a betrayal of public trust. Such actions directly contradict any credible counterterrorism strategy and fuel perceptions of ethnic favoritism within the country’s security leadership.

3. A Deepening Crisis of Leadership

The consistent pattern of embedding armed operatives from a controversial ethnic militia into state security frameworks represents a catastrophic failure of counterterrorism doctrine and places the Office of the National Security Adviser in an untenable position. No responsible government engaged in fighting a complex insurgency deliberately arms and integrates militias that are ideologically and ethnically tied to the very violence it claims to be combating. Such a strategy not only fails to address the root causes of conflict but actively exacerbates them by legitimizing groups accused of mass atrocities. Outsourcing public safety in this manner dismantles the professionalism of the formal security architecture and erodes the state’s credibility as an impartial arbiter of justice and security. This repeated behavior has led to overwhelming national and international calls for the immediate removal of Nuhu Ribadu as National Security Adviser. The argument is that national security cannot be safely entrusted to an individual whose policies consistently appear to offer protection, peace deals, or official legitimacy to armed organizations responsible for spreading terror and dispossessing citizens of their land and livelihoods. His continued tenure is seen as a direct threat to national cohesion and a significant obstacle to any genuine counterterrorism efforts.

The crisis of leadership extends beyond the National Security Adviser’s office, with troubling allegations also surrounding Bello Matawalle, Nigeria’s Minister of State for Defence. In recent weeks, claims have resurfaced, amplified by a former aide, that Matawalle sponsored key bandit leaders during his time as governor of Zamfara State. These accusations are bolstered by widely circulated videos in which the notorious bandit commander Bello Turji, who is linked to the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of farmers in the North-West, openly stated that Matawalle’s administration paid bandits with public funds under the pretext of negotiating peace. While Matawalle has denied any wrongdoing, arguing that these engagements were part of a necessary peace strategy, critics argue that peace purchased with cash payments and impunity for terrorists is not peace at all. Instead, it constitutes state-funded terror management, a policy that rewards violence and incentivizes criminal enterprises. When viewed alongside the revelations from Kwara and Nasarawa, the allegations against Matawalle reinforce a chilling conclusion: key figures within Nigeria’s top defense and security circles are pursuing policies that consistently empower, reward, and normalize terrorism, thereby undermining the nation’s capacity to defend its citizens.

4. Rationalizing Failure Amidst International Scrutiny

Perhaps nothing encapsulates the depth of the rot within Nigeria’s security leadership more starkly than a statement attributed to the immediate past Defence Minister, Abubakar Badaru. During the week of his resignation, he reportedly remarked that security forces could not effectively target bandits because they “live in forests where bombs cannot penetrate.” This assertion is not only factually incorrect but is also professionally disqualifying for anyone in a high-level defense position. Modern militaries across the globe have developed sophisticated doctrines and technologies for conducting warfare in forested terrain, and Nigeria’s own armed forces have successfully executed such operations in international peacekeeping missions. The claim that bombs are ineffective in forests is not a genuine tactical assessment; it is a thinly veiled excuse for inaction and failure. It exposes a leadership class that appears more invested in rationalizing its inability to defeat terrorism than in developing and implementing effective strategies to confront it. This mindset creates a permissive environment for insecurity to fester, as it signals to both citizens and adversaries that the will to win is absent at the highest levels of command, thereby emboldening terrorist and bandit groups to continue their campaigns of violence without fear of decisive state action.

The consequences of these internal failures are now manifesting on the international stage. The recent decision by the United States to impose visa restrictions on certain Nigerian individuals has been met with predictable outrage within the country, with many viewing the measure as unfair or overly punitive. However, this perspective overlooks the fundamental responsibility of any sovereign nation to protect its own security interests. From an external viewpoint, when a country’s government appears to be mainstreaming terrorism into its official structures by arming ethnic militias, shielding their leaders from prosecution, and appointing officials accused of terror appeasement to high office, that country becomes a source of regional and global instability. Terrorism is no longer an aberration to be fought but a phenomenon being managed and, in some cases, accommodated as policy-adjacent. In this context, actions like visa restrictions are not intended as punishment but as a necessary measure of self-defense for responsible nations seeking to insulate themselves from the fallout of state collapse and the normalization of terror. They are a clear signal that the world is watching and that the continued failure to confront extremism will lead to greater international isolation.

5. An Urgent Path to Restoration

To arrest Nigeria’s rapid descent into further instability and international isolation, a series of immediate and decisive actions is required to restore credibility and competence to the nation’s security leadership. First and foremost, Nuhu Ribadu must either resign or be removed from his position as National Security Adviser. His continued presence in this critical role has become untenable, as his office has been repeatedly linked to policies that empower armed militias and undermine public confidence in the federal government’s commitment to fighting terrorism impartially. Similarly, Bello Matawalle must be relieved of his duties as Minister of State for Defence pending a full and independent investigation into the serious allegations of terrorist sponsorship and appeasement during his tenure as governor. Holding these high-level officials accountable would send a powerful message that state-sanctioned impunity will no longer be tolerated. Furthermore, all armed formations linked to Miyetti Allah must be formally investigated for terrorism-related activities, disarmed, and permanently barred from participating in any official or unofficial security role. These steps are crucial for dismantling the architecture of state-sponsored militancy and re-establishing the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Beyond personnel changes, systemic reforms are essential to address the root causes of the current security crisis. Security appointments at all levels must be based on professional competence, experience, and integrity rather than on ethnic, religious, or political affiliations. The management of national security is too critical to be subjected to sentimental or partisan considerations; it demands the most qualified individuals who are committed to protecting all Nigerians equally. Concurrently, international partners have a vital role to play in encouraging these reforms. They must escalate the use of targeted sanctions, including asset freezes and expanded visa restrictions, against any Nigerian officials who are credibly linked to terror appeasement or the sponsorship of non-state armed groups. This external pressure can create powerful incentives for internal reform by imposing tangible consequences on those who undermine national and regional stability. By combining decisive internal house-cleaning with robust international accountability, Nigeria can begin to pull back from the brink, rebuild its fractured security institutions, and restore its standing as a responsible actor in the global community. Without these urgent interventions, the nation risks becoming a permanently failed state.

6. A Nation at a Decisive Crossroads

The arrest of armed Miyetti Allah operatives in Kwara State was not merely another scandal in a nation accustomed to them; it was a stark warning flare that illuminated the precipice upon which Nigeria stood. This incident laid bare a security architecture that was collapsing from within, compromised by policies that seemed to favor ethnic agendas over national interest. It became clear that the nation had arrived at a defining crossroads, facing a fundamental choice between two divergent paths. One path led further down the road of mainstreaming terrorism through appeasement, impunity, and the empowerment of partisan militias, a trajectory that promised only greater internal conflict and international isolation. The alternative path required a reclamation of the state’s most basic function: the impartial protection of all its citizens, without fear or favor. The events underscored that Nigeria’s future depended entirely on which of these paths its leadership chose to follow. The world watched, and with increasing frequency, it acted, signaling that the accommodation of terror was a policy it would not indefinitely tolerate.

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